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The influence of property rights on economic growth 
“Is democracy good for the poor?” is the title of the paper of Michael Ross, who 
claims that democracies are not a better form of regime type for poorer people in society than 
autocracies (2006, p. 860).  With this question, Ross addresses an important subject, namely 
the effect of different regime types on economic development and redistribution. There is no 
consensus about the relation of democracies and autocracies on economic growth 
(Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008, p. 1520). A good way to compare these different regimes 
is by exploring the political institutions of these regimes. Political institutions have an impact 
on economic development (Wright, 2008, p. 336). Institutions are big and vague concepts to 
examine. There are smaller concepts, which can be explored. The protection of property rights 
is one aspect, which has effect on economic growth (Wright, 2008, p. 336).  
 The question this paper wants to answer therefore is; “What is the influence of 
property rights on economic growth?” The paper is split up in four parts. The first part will 
explore the literature on the relation of regime types and institutions on economic growth. 
This part also explores explanations for these relations. Finally, this part will explore the 
question of which factor came first; regime type or property rights. The second part sets out 
the three hypotheses, which are used to answer the research question. The first hypothesis is 
that the protection of property rights has a positive effect on the level of a state’s gross 
domestic product (GDP). The second hypothesis states that the relation between regime type 
and economic growth is a spurious relationship. The third hypothesis is that democratic 
regimes protect property rights better than autocratic regimes. Moreover, that part contains the 
conceptualization. The third part exists of the methodology used for the statistical analyses to 
test the hypotheses. The used data will also be explained. The fourth part exists of the 
statistical regression analyses to test the hypotheses and the results. The results show the 
statistical relation of the variables.  
Theoretical framework 
Different theories 
There are different ideas about the effect of regime types on economic growth 
(Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008, p. 1520). Some people claim that democracy has a positive 
effect on economic growth. Others, however, do not agree with this claim, because of the lack 
of empirical data to support it (Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008, p. 1520). There is no 
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consensus on the effect of political regimes on economic growth. Papaioannou and Siourounis 
distinguish three different kind of theories in their article about the relationship between 
democracy and economic growth, namely ‘Sceptical’ Theories, ‘Development’ Theories and 
‘Institutional’ Theories (2008, pp. 1523-1525).       
 The ‘Sceptical’ Theories are critical towards the claim that democracy has a positive 
effect on economic growth. In democracies, politicians want to be (re-)elected. Politicians will 
listen tot the median-voter to accomplish this (Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008, p. 1524). 
Politicians will therefore make policy preferred by the median-voter. This has a negative 
effect on economic growth, because the median-voter prefers a fiscal policy that encourages 
redistribution (Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008, p. 1524). That policy leads to higher taxes 
and lower investments. Higher taxes and lower investments cause lower economic growth. 
The problem concerning median-voters does not occur in autocracies. This can be the 
explanation for the economic growth of East Asian countries. Their governments would not 
implement redistributive fiscal policies (Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008, p. 1524).  
 The second theory Papaioannou and Siourounis describe, is the ‘Development Theory’. 
This theory states that representative institutions contribute to economic growth (Papaioannou 
& Siourounis, 2008, p. 1524). There are two reasons for this positive effect. The first reason is 
that redistribution contributes to economic growth by investing in education or to lower 
imperfections of the capital market. Second, the transaction costs of socio-political 
organizations are lower in democracies. For example, the elections solve issues concerning 
commitment and a democratic system is very capable in gathering and transmitting 
information (Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008, p. 1524). Democracies can also handle 
economic crises better and are political more stable.     
 The last theory is the ‘Institutional Theory’. This theory argues the importance of 
institutions and the history of these institutions (Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008, p. 1525). 
The theory has a strong focus on the role of institutions on economic and political 
development instead of focussing on different regimes. Institutions are the explanation for 
economic growth or decline. Przeworski and Limongi argue in their article that there is no 
clear evidence that a regime type influences economic growth.  However, institutions can 
have a positive effect on the economy (Przeworski & Limongi, 1993, p. 65). Institutions are 
present in both autocracies and democracies and can therefore be an explanation for the 
difference in economic growth. The lack of evidence for the relation between economic 
growth and regime type calls for another explanation. That is why this paper looks at a 
different explanation.  
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Institutions 
Institutions can have a positive effect on economic development. An example of the 
positive effect of institutions on economic growth is human capital. Namely, human capital 
influences economic growth (Gerring, Bond, Barndt & Moreno, 2005, p. 327). Institutions 
can improve education, life expectancy and public health. These institutions work better in 
democracies than in autocracies (Gerring, Bond, Barndt & Moreno, 2005, p. 328). However, 
economic growth does not necessarily depend solely on democratic institutions, but also on 
factors like human capital. Institutions have an important role in the economy of states, 
because institutions provide certainty (Gerring, Bond, Barndt & Moreno, 2005, p. 332). 
Gerring et al. state that the length of a democratic regime has a positive effect on the level of 
institutionalization. The length of an autocratic regime does not affect the level of 
institutionalisation (2005, p. 333). The reason for this difference in the level of 
institutionalization is the way how states are ruled. Personalized power opposes the 
development of a legally working bureaucracy (2005, p. 333).     
 Democratic institutions do not improve only human capital and provide political 
stability; they can also establish a rule of law in a society. Gerring, Bond, Barndt and Moreno 
describe the rule of law with different requirements: law must be general, laws must be 
published, retroactivity is avoided, laws are understandable and clear, contradictions in the 
legal system are avoided, laws can only ask what is possible, laws are constant and where the 
violation of laws leads to action (2005, p. 336). A rule of law secures property rights, which 
has a positive effect on the economy. The problem with authoritarian regimes is that power is 
personalized most of the time, which contradicts the rule of law (Gerring, Bond, Barndt & 
Moreno, 2005, p. 336). Without a rule of law, future decisions cannot be taken by leaders, 
because laws can be changed easily. This is harmful for the political stability and therefore 
also for the economic development.         
 Besides being harmful for political stability, autocracies can be damaging for the 
protection of property rights (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared, 2009, p. 1054). The 
security of property rights and legal equality are important for economic development (2009, 
p. 1054).  An important factor in the economic development of states is institutions, especially 
the economic institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared sate that democracies and 
income are positively correlated, (2009, p. 1057). However, these authors claim that there is 
no causal relation between income and democracy. The positive correlation has arisen due to 
historical factors and developments. The political and economic developments in most 
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democracies have been interlinked through time, explaining the positive correlation 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared, 2009, p. 1057). Democracies have better working 
institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared explain that this has to do with 
developments over time. 
The role of bureaucracies 
Well organized institutions can have a positive effect on economic growth. In both 
democracies, as in autocracies, institutions play an important role on the governmental level. 
Namely, governments, both democratic and autocratic, need institutions to govern properly. A 
form of a political institution is the bureaucracy. Evans and Rauch their research is about the 
effect of a bureaucracy, and its organization, on economic growth (1999). They especially 
look at the organization and functioning of the bureaucracy, as what they call the “Weberian” 
bureaucracy. Evans and Rauch use two of Weber’s points to describe the organization of a 
bureaucracy (1999, p. 751). The first point is the meritocratic way to select bureaucratic 
personnel. The meritocratic way means that personnel is selected based on their education and 
if they pass certain exams. The second point is the predictable career and the incentive for 
bureaucratic personnel to perform well (Evans & Rauch, 1999, p. 751).    
  Hence, Evans and Rauch made two points that describe the organization of a 
bureaucracy. The presence of a meritocratic selection of personnel affects the functioning of a 
bureaucracy. Namely, this type of selection makes sure that the most competent employees 
get the job. Besides that, a more corporate way of working will be implemented in the 
bureaucracy (Evans & Rauch, 1999, p. 752). The chance on a long and rewarding career can 
be helpful to create an environment without corruption. The small rewards that bureaucratic 
personnel receive through corruptive actions do not weigh up to the rewards of a long and 
promising career (Evans & Rauch, 1999, p. 752).       
 Long term decisions can be made and executed, because of these two points. Evans 
and Rauch perform a regression analysis in their paper between the level of “Weberianness” 
of the bureaucracies and state’s GDP. The result is that there is a strong correlation between 
the two (1999, pp. 755-756). However, lower levels of per capita income do not necessarily 
oppose the achievement of good bureaucracies. In the regression analysis of Evans and Rauch 
no association was found between the level of income and the “Weberianness” of a state’s 
bureaucracy (1999, p. 756). Besides that, there is also a small correlation between the 
“Weberianness” of bureaucracies and the level of human capital in a state (Evans & Rauch, 
1999, p. 756). As stated earlier, the level of human capital influences economic growth. 
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 To sum it up, there is no consensus on the relation between regime type and economic 
growth. However, much research has been done on the effect of institutions and the 
organization of bureaucracies on economic growth. Both political institutions, and 
bureaucracies, are necessary for regimes to function. The terms institutions and bureaucracies 
can be vague, as both terms are consisting of many different factors. It is therefore necessary 
to focus on a more specific factor.         
 The protection of property rights has a positive effect on economic growth (Catrinescu, 
Leon-Ledesma, Piracha & Quillin, 2009, p.2). The protection of property rights is the task of 
the government. It is executed by governmental institutions. Knack and Keefer state that the 
protection of property rights is necessary for economic development (1995, p.18). Besides 
that, property rights are important for the level of investments in a state. This has a positive 
effect on the level of GDP. This effect grows when the investments are also controlled by 
governmental institutions. The protection of property rights does not only enlarge the amount 
of investment, but also the efficiency of the allocation of the input (Knack and Keefer, 1995, p. 
19). The protection of property rights has been stated earlier as a factor, which contributes to 
economic development. The protection of property rights is a good factor to research, because 
it is present in both democratic and autocratic systems. 
The effect of property rights on economic development 
Demzets gives arguments in his paper on why a good working private property system 
is beneficial for the economy. Demzets argues that the price of traded goods depends on the 
rights over these goods and the way these rights are enforced (1964, p. 17). The enforcement 
of property rights is important for the measurement of private benefits of products (Demzets, 
1964, p. 17). An example to illustrate the influence of property rights on private benefit is the 
car industry. When there are no laws that prohibit car theft then the demand for cars will 
lower. When customers can use cars of others legally, it is not beneficial for them to buy cars 
for themselves.  A lowering demand causes a lowering price of the product (Demzets, 1964, 
pp. 17-18). The effect of this lowering of the price is the lowering of the private benefit for 
the producer.           
 The value of products is higher when there are institutions which protect and enforce 
property rights (Demzets, 1964, 18). The effect on the level of the gross domestic product is 
therefore beneficial. The level of GDP depends on the value of all produced goods in a state 
(World Bank, 2016). So, when the value of a good rises, due to the protection of property 
rights, then the GDP level also rises. Nee examines the changing institutional environment in 
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China from the state-led economy to a more open economy. Nee also discusses the effect of 
property rights. Because of newly introduced property rights, among other things, the number 
of private firms became to grow (Nee, 1992, pp. 19-20). The private firms had a rapid growth 
in the value of their output, certainly in comparison with the output of state led companies 
(Nee, 1992, p. 22). This institutional change of protecting property rights causes an 
entrepreneurial incentive. The growing output of goods is beneficial for the GDP level.
 Besides the entrepreneurial incentive, protecting property rights can also cause 
incentives of investments (Besley, 1995, p. 936). Besley investigates two regions to find out 
what the influence is of the protection of property rights on the level of investment. There was, 
however, a difference in the outcome of the two regions. In one region, there was a positive 
relation between the level of investment and property rights, while the other region missed 
this relation (Besley, 1995, p. 936). Besley argues, notwithstanding, that property rights can 
be important for the level of investment. Property rights and investment can affect each other 
(Besley, 1995, p. 931). When the level of investment rises, the protection of property rights 
will also improve and vice versa. The protection of property right can therefore positively 
affect the investment level. This is beneficial for the GDP level, as more investment causes a 
higher level of production. 
The relation between property rights and regime types 
  A possible explanation why democratic regimes do have a better working property 
rights system is the relationship between economic and political institutions. Acemoglu and 
Robinson make a distinction between inclusive and extractive institutions. Inclusive economic 
institutions do protect property rights (2012, p. 429). By doing this, inclusive economic 
institutions cause economic growth. Inclusive political institutions distribute power widely 
over the population. This distribution cause a pluralistic political system, in which different 
groups have influence on the policy making process. These inclusive institutions strengthen 
each other (2012, p. 430). An inclusive political institution does have more features of a 
democracy, in which power is distributed among many people, instead of an autocracy. Hence, 
democracies as inclusive political institutions strengthen inclusive economic institutions. 
Inclusive economic institutions protect property rights. This can be a reason that democratic 
regimes protect property rights better, because of their institutions.   
 Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson make a division between autocracies with long 
standing leaders and autocracies with short standing leaders (1996, p. 271). They argue that 
autocracies with long standing leaders benefit the protection of property rights (1996, p. 271). 
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The protection of property rights was found more often in democracies than in autocracies. 
However, this protection was worse in short existing democracies than in long existing 
democracies (1996, p. 271). The duration of a democratic regime is much more important 
than the duration of a democratic leader. Besides that, the protection of property rights is more 
sensitive to changes in time in autocratic regimes than in democratic regimes (1996, p. 271). 
This could explain that democratic regimes protect property rights better than autocracies. It 
needs time to develop a well-functioning system of property rights. A democratic regime does 
have a more stable institutional system, because most laws and regulations cannot be changed 
that easily per new government. This is in contrast with autocratic regimes, where new leaders 
can change laws more easily.          
 Another reason why property rights are better protected in democracies is because of 
the idea of impartiality (Rothstein & Teorrel, 2008, pp. 183-184). The idea of impartiality is 
that the execution of law by a governmental worker should not depend on the person/case, 
besides what is formulated in the law itself (Rothstein & Teorrel, 2008, p. 170). Personal 
relations should not play a role when laws are executed.  Civil servants, judges, politicians 
and other governmental related workers should work by this idea. Impartiality takes a long 
time to develop in a state. A good working system of property rights needs a general accepted 
idea of impartiality. Thus, the people will not trust governmental workers to protect their 
property properly (Rothstein & Teorrel, 2008, p. 184). Some societies, however, have a 
system of patrimonial or personal relation. Here, there is little belief in the capability of civil 
servants. As stated earlier, autocratic regimes have power centralized around a person. This 
makes personalized relations more likely in that regime, making property rights less likely.    
 So, there are a few reasons for the positive relation between the level of a state’s 
property rights system and the level of GDP. First, the protection of property rights is 
beneficial for the private benefit of a product. Besides that, without protection of property 
rights, the demand for products will lower. This has a negative effect on the GDP level. 
Second, the number of private firms can grow because of property rights. More private firms 
cause more output, which means a higher GDP level. The third reason is the positive effect on 
the level of investment.         
 Another relation that is explained is the relation between regime types and property 
rights. It is important to know how this relation has arisen and which factor came first; 
property rights or regime types. Democracies do have a better working property rights system. 
This is due to the positive relation between inclusive political and inclusive economic 
institutions. Also, democracies have a more stable institutional system, which is less 
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vulnerable to changes. Finally, the idea of impartiality is more present in democratic regimes 
than in autocratic regimes.           
 Property rights do have more influence on the level of GDP than regime type. 
However, flawed and democratic regimes do protect the property better than autocratic 
regimes. The two variables relate to each other. The reasons for this relation were explained 
earlier. It is therefore difficult to say what the exact relation is between the variables. It has to 
do with the more stable institutions of democracies. As stated before, long lasting autocracies 
do also have good working property rights. The duration of a regime is important for the level 
of a state’s property rights system. Thus, the duration of regimes can be the reason that 
democratic regimes do protect property better than autocratic regimes. It is also hard to say if 
regimes types came first and protection of property rights second, or vice versa. Namely, 
different regime types all need institutions, like the protection of property rights, to exist. 
Different regimes are connected with different institutions over time, which makes it difficult 
to state which factor came first.  
Hypotheses and Concepts 
Hypotheses 
Three hypotheses put up to answer the research question, which will be tested: 
- The protection of property rights has a positive effect on the level of a state’s gross 
domestic product (GDP). 
- Regime types affect economic growth. However, this relation is influenced by the 
protection of property rights.  
- Democratic states protect property rights better than autocratic states. 
By testing these hypotheses, the effect of protection property rights becomes clearer. The 
three hypotheses were derived from the earlier discussed literature. The first hypothesis will 
be tested to research the relation of the protection of property rights on economic 
development. The protection of property rights is a part of the functioning of institutions, 
however it is more concrete to measure and test. .      
 The second hypothesis states that the relation between regime types and economic 
growth is affected by the protection of property rights. There is no consensus on the relation 
between regime type and economic growth. However, some of the authors believe that there 
is indeed a positive relationship between the two. There will be a positive effect of 
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democracies on economic growth. However, this relationship is not accounted for the fact that 
a state is a democracy. The relation is influenced by a third factor, namely the protection of 
property rights.           
 By testing the final hypothesis, an indication is given if democratic regimes do indeed 
protect property rights better than autocratic regimes. The connection between regime type 
and economic growth and the connection between regime type and the protection of property 
rights will be explained through the combination of these hypotheses. This will give an 
overview about the relation between the variables.  
Concepts  
Property rights 
The protection of property rights can be interpreted differently. Property rights can be 
both physical, as it can be intellectual. Physical property is much more concrete than 
intellectual property, because it is material. Intellectual property is harder to define, because it 
consists mostly out of ideas. However, it can be hard to determine property rights exactly 
(Besley, 1995, p. 905). The Property Rights Alliance composes the International Property 
Right Index (IPRI), which is an annual report on the protection of property rights. In these 
reports, there are multiple factors contributing to the concept of property rights. The 
organisation works with 62 other global institutions to compose this index.  
 The IPRI report uses three components to define the value of a state’s property rights 
system. The first is the legal and political environment. The second is the physical property 
rights and the final one is the intellectual property rights (IPRI, 2016, p. 5). In the report, these 
components are divided into subdivisions. The legal and political environment is divided into 
judicial independence, rule of law, political stability and control of corruption. The physical 
property rights are divided into protection of property rights, registering property and the ease 
of access to loans. The intellectual property right is divided into protection of property rights, 
patent protection and copyright piracy (IPRI, 2016, p. 5). The index covers multiple factors 
concerning property rights, which makes the concept clearer.     
  
Regime type 
Regime type, just like property rights, is a broad concept which consists out of many 
factors. There is no academic consensus on how to define regime types, like democracies and 
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autocracies, exactly (EIU, 2016, p. 51). A regime type in the most basic sense is the way how 
a state is ruled, either by elected politicians or by non-elected political leaders. However, 
defining concepts like democracy and autocracy is not that simple. For example, some define 
democracy as a dichotomous concept; a state is either a democracy or not. On the other side, 
there are indices which measure democracy as a continuous concept (EIU, 2016, p. 51). 
 There are different ways to conceptualize democracy and autocracy. There are 
however some aspects of a democracy that are certain. First, governments are based on the 
majority rule, which means that decisions are made with a majority of the votes. Second there 
are fair and free elections. Finally, the minority rights are protected (EIU, 2016, p.51). There 
can be made a partition between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ concepts of democracy. The ‘thin’ 
definition focuses solely on the electoral part of a democracy. On the opposite is the ‘thick’ 
definition, which is a more complete and broader definition (EIU, 2016, p. 52). The 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) uses five categories to conceptualize a democracy, namely 
electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of the government, political 
participation and political culture (EIU, 2016, p. 52). The concept of democracy combines all 
these factors.             
Gross domestic product 
Economic growth is the final concept which is used in the hypotheses. Economic 
growth can be conceptualized through the development of the GDP level. The GDP is the 
gross value of all produced goods and services in an economy. The calculation is made 
without deduction for the depreciation of fabricated assets. The calculation is also without the 
depletion and degradation of natural resources (World Bank, 2016). This is the most common 
way to conceptualize economic growth. There are other ways to conceptualize economic 
growth, like GDP per capita growth. However, in most literature, the use of a state’s GDP is 
the most common way to conceptualize economic growth.  
Methodology and Data 
Methodology 
To test the hypotheses, regression analyses will be used to test the possible correlation 
of the different data. A comparison with 128 states is used (N=128). These states represent all 
parts of the world (IPRI, 2016, p. 27).  This is a quantitative study. All the states, for which 
data is available, are used. The reason to use so many states has to do with the validity of the 
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outcome of the regression analyses. The results of quantitative analyses are beneficial for the 
external validity. The outcome is externally valid when the results are also applicable for non-
examined states (Bryman, 2012, p. 711). When all the possible states are examined, then the 
results will be more plausible. This makes the outcome of the analyses more applicable for the 
other states, which are not examined.       
 For the comparison between these variables, a regression analysis is used. These 
analyses can define a relationship between variables, both negative as positive. Through a 
statistical analysis, a possible correlation can be computed. A positive relationship between 
variables means that an increase in the value of one variable means that there will be an 
increase in the value of the other variable as well. The value of both variables decrease with a 
negative relation (Argyrous, 2014, p. 234). The hypotheses can be tested by using these 
regression analyses, because the relation of the variables is computed. These analyses can 
show if there is a positive or negative relation between the variables.   
 To test the hypothesis that the protection of property rights has a positive effect on 
economic growth, the variables ‘property rights’ and ‘economic growth’ are used in a 
regression analysis. The outcome of this analysis determines if there is a relation between the 
dependent ‘economic growth’ and the independent ‘property rights’. When there is a positive 
relationship, then the hypothesis will not be rejected. The second and third hypotheses are 
tested the same way. The second hypothesis, which states that the relationship between 
regime type and economic growth is a spurious relationship, will also be tested through a 
regression analysis. To control if the relationship is indeed a spurious relationship, the 
variable “property rights” is used as a control. A spurious relationship is a relationship that 
only is a relationship, because of a third factor. Without that factor, there won’t be a 
relationship.           
 The final hypothesis, that democratic states protect property rights better than 
autocratic regimes, will also be tested through a regression analysis. The variables ‘property 
rights’ and ‘regime types’ are compared. The results of the different regression analyses will 
be explained in the following part. 
Data 
The data for all the variables are derived from different indices. The following indices 
are used: the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, the International Property 
Rights Index and the World Bank Dataset. These indices have collected data from the biggest 
part of the states in the world and are therefore very useful for executing regression analyses. 
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The International Property Rights Index has data available of 128 states. Therefore, this is the 
largest sample.           
 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index is used to collect data for the 
variable regime type. This index uses 60 indicators to define a state on a scale from 0.0 till 10. 
The score defies the regime type of a state. Below the score of 4.0, a state is an authoritarian 
regime. From 4.0 till 5.9, a state is a hybrid regime. From 6.0 till 7.9, a state is flawed 
democracy. States are full democracies if they score an 8.0 or higher on the index (EIU, 2016, 
p. 54). Thus, states can be grouped into four different forms of regime types. The index has 
collected its information through different channels, like public surveys and different 
barometers. Using different surveys and barometers is very useful to define the 60 indicators 
(EIU, 2016, pp. 55-56). These 60 indicators give a complete picture of different regime types, 
because multiple aspects are used to define a regime. This makes the index very useful to the 
regime type of the different states in the world. The index has data available for 167 states.
 The variable regime type is measured quite similarly in the paper of Clague et al. The 
variable is split up in five different regime types, ranging from autocracy to democracy 
(Clague, Keefer, Knack & Olson, 1996, p. 252). Gerring et al. measure regime types based on 
multiple factors (Gerring, Bond, Barndt & Moreno, 2005, pp. 338-339). The data is derived 
from an external dataset, which factors match with the factors from the EIU dataset. For 
example, both indices look at the electoral process and use a broad term instead of a 
dichotomous term for regime type. In the paper of Papaioannou, regime type is measured by 
four questions. These questions also partly match with the EIU index, namely elections and 
political rights are used to measure the regime type (Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008, p. 
1527). So, there are different ways to measure regime type. However, most of the 
measurements used by the other literature matches with the EIU index. This index contains 
more factors, making it an index which measure regime type more completely.  
 The data for the variable property rights is collected through the International Property 
Rights Index. The index places states in a ranking with scores from 0 to10 (IPRI, 2016, p. 10). 
A score of 10 is the highest value for the property rights system. A score of 0 is the lowest 
value. The index combines data from different sources to create a complete measurement for 
property rights. As stated above, the property rights system is a combined factor. For each of 
the 10 factors, the index has used public sources from different international organisations 
(IPRI, 2016, p. 10). Therefore, the index is a combination of different public sources, indices 
and measurements of different international organisations.    
 Knack and Keefer use two different indices to measure the value of a state’s property 
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rights system, namely the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the Business 
Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) (1995, pp. 5-6). These indices, like the IPRI index, 
look at the rule of law and the level of corruption. Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson also 
make use of the ICRG and BERI indices. Catrinescu et al. also use data from the ICRG index 
in his paper (Catrinescu, Leon-Ledesma, Piracha & Quillin, 2009, pp. 83-84). Besley makes 
use of public surveys to measure the protection of property rights (1995, p. 913). The IPRI 
index matches partly with the ICRG and BERI indices. However, the IPRI index uses many 
different factors to measure property rights, making it a complete index to use.  
 The data for the variable economic growth is available from the dataset of the World 
Bank. The available data shows the level of GDP of states from 2015 (World Bank, 2016). 
Besides that, the states are also ranked in an index from the lower GDP levels to the higher 
GDP levels. This is very useful for the comparison with the other variables, because these are 
also ranked in an index. The different indices have derived their data from different sources. 
Besides that, the indices consist of different indicators. The indices, therefore, measure other 
factors.     
Statistical Analysis 
The analyses are uses to test the hypotheses. The analyses contain information about 
128 states (N = 128) (see Appendix 1 for the list of states).  The statistical significance of 
each variable will be added to the tables. The level of statistical significance gives information 
about correlation between variables. The results show data from the variables with connection 
to the confidence interval. When the value of a statistical significance of a variable is 0.05, 
then the correlation between the variables in the analyses is significant with a reliability of 
95%. 
First hypothesis 
First, the relation of the variables ‘property rights’ and ‘GDP’ is tested through a 
regression analysis. The mean value of property rights system is 5.4 and the mean value of 
GDP is 570,70 billion dollars (see appendix 2). The range of the variable GDP varies from a 
minimum of 2 billion dollars to 18037 billion dollars. The results of this regression are shown 
in Table 1 (see appendix 3). The result of this analysis is that the estimated coefficient is 
326.7. The independent variable is ‘property rights’ and the dependent variable ‘GDP’. The 
meaning of the coefficient is that when a state rises 1 point on the scale of the Property Rights 
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Index, then the level of the state’s gross domestic product will rise with 326.7 billion dollars.
   
Table 1 
Coefficients from the regression analysis on property rights (independent variable) with 
the level of GDP (dependent variable) 
Independent variable Analysis  
Property Rights * 326.7 
[116.9]
a 
a. [x] stands for the Standard Error. 
b. * p < 0.10 
The first hypothesis states that there is a positive relationship between the value of state’s 
property rights system and the level of a state’s GDP. There is indeed a positive relation 
between the two, as the results of the regression analysis show. A rise of 326.7 billion dollars 
is a large rise in a state’s GDP. The level of statistical significance of the variable “property 
rights” is 0.06. The results indicate that the hypothesis is therefore not rejected. 
Second hypothesis 
To test the second hypothesis, firstly the variable regime type has been split into four 
sub variables. These four variables are ‘democratic regime’, ‘flawed regime’, ‘hybrid regime’ 
and ‘autocratic regime’. The four regimes types have different scores, following the EIU 
Democracy Index. From the 128 different states 26 are autocratic, 33 are hybrid, 49 are 
flawed and 20 are democratic (see appendix 2). Thereafter, these four regimes were used in a 
multiple regression analysis with the variable ‘GDP’ to examine the possible relation between 
regime type and the level of a state’s GDP. There are four different analyses, because every 
regime type has been excluded with the purpose of finding out what the relation is between 
the different regime types and the level of GDP (see Appendix 4). The results are shown in 
table 2.  
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Table 2 
Coefficients from the regression analyses on regime types (independent variable) with 
the level of GDP (dependent variable) 
Independent 
Variable 
Analysis 1
a 
Analysis 2
a 
Analysis 3
a 
Analysis 4
a 
Autocratic 
Regime 
- 497.2 
[509.5] 
-213.9 
[471.5] 
-132.5 
[577.9] 
Hybrid Regime -497.2 
[509.5]
b 
- -711.1 
[437.6] 
-629.7 
[550.6] 
Flawed Regime 213.9 
[471.5] 
711.136 
[437.6] 
- 81.4 
[515.6] 
Democratic 
Regime  
132.5 
[577.9] 
629.7 
[550.6] 
-81.4 
[515.6] 
- 
a. There have been executed four analyses, each with the missing of one regime type. 
Analysis 1 is without autocratic regime, analysis 2 without hybrid regime, analysis 3 
without flawed regime and analysis 4 without democratic regime.  
b. [x] stands for the Standard Error 
Table 2 shows the results of the four multiple regression analyses. The data show the effect of 
a change in regime type on the level of GDP. The data from analysis 1 show that a regime 
change from an autocratic regime to a hybrid regime causes a decline in the level of GDP of 
497.2 million dollars. The change from a flawed regime to another regime is remarkable, 
because this will cause a decline in the level of GDP.     
 The hypothesis states that the value of state’s property rights system explains the 
relation between regime type and economic growth, and not the regime type. To test this 
hypothesis, the variable ‘property rights’ has been added to the multiple regression analyses. 
The result of these analyses is shown in table 3.  
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Table 3 
Coefficients from the regression analyses on regime types (independent variable) with 
the level of GDP (dependent variable), with the third variable property rights 
(independent) 
Independent 
Variable 
Analysis 1
a 
Analysis 2
a 
Analysis 3
a 
Analysis 4
a 
Property Rights 468.8* 
[174.0]
b 
468.8* 
[174.0] 
468.8* 
[174.0] 
468.8* 
[174.0] 
Autocratic 
Regime 
- 181.2 
[508.8] 
185.1 
[480.7] 
1136.4 
[722.7] 
Hybrid Regime -181.2 
[508.8] 
- 3.9 
[496.8] 
955.2 
[779.9] 
Flawed Regime -185.1 
[480.7] 
-3.9 
[496.8] 
- 951.3 
[590.5] 
Democratic 
Regime 
-1136.4 
[722.7] 
-955.2 
[779.9] 
-951.3 
[590.5] 
- 
a. There have been executed four analyses, each with the missing of one regime type. 
Analysis 1 is without autocratic regime, analysis 2 without hybrid regime, analysis 3 
without flawed regime and analysis 4 without democratic regime.  
b. [x] stands for the Standard Error 
c. * p < 0.10 
The value of the coefficient of the variable ‘property rights’ is 468.8 in the four analyses. The 
level of significance of the variable ‘property rights’ in the analysis is 0.06. The level of 
significance of the other variables are higher than 0.06 (see appendix 5). This means that the 
relation between the variable ‘property rights’ and ‘GDP’ is more statistical significant than 
the relation of ‘regime type’ with ‘GDP’.       
 Another point that stands out is the high levels of change in gross domestic product. 
For example, when an autocratic regime changes to a democratic regime, then the level of 
GDP will lower with 1136.4 billion dollars. This is a very large change in the level of GDP. In 
the multiple regressions without the variable “property rights”, a similar change in regime 
type would enlarge the level of GDP with 132.5 billion dollars. This change is due to the 
adding of the variable “regime type” to the analysis.      
 This variable has a constant coefficient for every regime type in this analysis, which 
means it is assumed that the variable “property rights” has the same relation with each of the 
different forms of ‘regime type’. However, this variable is not constant for every form of 
regime type. The data for the following analysis will show a difference in the regimes types 
and the value of state’s property rights. This means that the data from table 3 is not usable for 
a statement about the absolute change in the level of GDP. But, the results of table 3 give 
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information about the statistical significance of the relation between the variables.  Namely, 
the variable ‘property rights’ has a different correlation with the different variables of ‘regime 
type’.            
 To solve this problem, a new multiple regression analysis will be executed to deal with 
the interaction effect. This effect will be explained later. The results of the regression analysis 
give information about the statistical effect of ‘property rights’ and ‘regime type’ on ‘GDP’. 
The relation between ‘property rights’ and ‘GDP’ is more significant than the relation 
between ‘GDP’ and ‘regime type’. This is line with the second hypothesis, which states that 
the variable “property rights” explains the relation between ‘regime type’ and ‘GDP’.   
Third hypothesis  
The third hypothesis states that the democratic regimes have a better working property 
rights system than autocratic regimes.  To test this hypothesis, regression analyses have been 
executed with the variable ‘property rights’ and the sub variables of ‘regime type’ (see 
appendix 6). The results are shown in table 4. 
Table 4 
Coefficients from the regression analyses on regime types (independent variable) with 
the value of a state’s property rights (dependent variable) 
 
Independent 
variable 
Analysis 1
a
 Analysis 2
a
 Analysis 3
a
 Analysis 4
a
 
Autocratic 
Regime 
- 0.65 
[0.26] 
-0.82 *** 
[0.24] 
-2.61 *** 
[0.29] 
Hybrid Regime -0.65 
[0.26]
b
 
- -1.5 *** 
[0.22] 
-3.26 *** 
[0.28] 
Flawed Regime 0.82 *** 
[0.24] 
1.467 *** 
[0.22] 
- -1.7 *** 
[0.26] 
Democratic 
Regime 
2.61 *** 
[0.29] 
3.27 *** 
[0.28] 
1.7 *** 
[0.26] 
- 
a. There have been executed four analyses, each with the missing of one regime type. 
Analysis 1 is without autocratic regime, analysis 2 without hybrid regime, analysis 3 
without flawed regime and analysis 4 without democratic regime.  
b. [x] stands for Standard Error 
c. *** p < 0.01 
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The results show that a change from any regime type to a democratic regime type has a 
positive effect on the value of a state’s property rights system. A regime change from an 
autocratic regime to a democratic regime means a change of 2.61 points on the scale of the 
property rights. A change from a hybrid regime towards a democratic regime means a 3.26 
rise on the property rights scale, as shown in table 4 analysis 4. This effect works vice versa; a 
change from a flawed of democratic regime to a hybrid or autocratic regime means a lowering 
on the property rights scale.         
 The hypothesis states that the democratic regimes have a higher value of property 
rights system than autocratic regimes. The results of the regression show that a change to a 
democratic regime does indeed have a positive effect on the value of a state’s property rights 
system. This positive effect means that the value of the property rights system rises, when 
there is a change towards a democratic regime. The hypothesis is therefore not rejected, 
because there is a positive effect of democratic regimes on the value of property rights. Both 
for flawed, as for democratic regime is this effect positive. A change from an autocratic or 
hybrid regime to a democratic or flawed regime is positive for the value of the property rights 
system.    
Interaction effect 
To completely test the second hypothesis, the problem of the constant value of the 
variable ‘property rights’ must be solved. In the regression of table 3, the constant value of 
‘property rights’ is based on the mean of the variable. This mean is used for every regime type. 
However, as the data in table 4 shows, the different variables of regime type have a different 
value of their property rights system. Therefore, the data from table 3 cannot completely test 
the second hypothesis. There is a probable interaction effect between the variables ‘GDP’ and 
‘regime type’, with a dependence on the third variable ‘property rights’. To solve the problem 
of the regression analysis in table 3, a new regression analysis is executed. The new 
regression analysis contains the variables ‘property rights’ and the sub variables of ‘regime 
type’. Besides these variables, four new variables are added. These variables are sub variables 
of ‘regime type’ multiplied with ‘property rights’. By doing this, the sub variables have their 
right value of “property rights” instead of the mean value (see appendix 7). The results of 
table 5 show a difference between the sub variables of ‘regime type’ and the sub variables 
‘regime type’ which are multiplied with ‘property rights’. 
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Table 5 
Coefficients from the regression analyses on regime type multiplied with property rights 
(independent variable), property rights (independent variable) and regime type 
(independent variable), with GDP (dependent variable) 
Independent 
variable 
Analysis 1 Analysis 2 Analysis 3 Analysis 4 
Property rights 218.3 
[341.1] 
-13.2 
[479.1] 
850.5*** 
[247.7] 
139.1 
[491.5] 
Autocratic regime - -626.2 
[2673.8] 
3573.3 
[2233.3] 
-157.7 
[4082.3] 
Hybrid regime 626.2 
[2673.8] 
- 4199.4* 
[2510.9] 
468.5 
[4240.6] 
Flawed regime -3573.3 
[2233.3] 
-4199.4* 
[2510.9] 
- -3730.9 
[3977.6] 
Democratic 
regime 
157.7 
[4082.3] 
-468.5 
[4240.6] 
3730.9 
[3977.6] 
- 
Autocratic regime 
^ Property 
- 231.6 
[588.2] 
-632.1 
[421.5] 
79.3 
[598.3] 
Hybrid regime ^ 
Property 
-231.6 
[588.1] 
- -863.7 
[539.3] 
-152.3 
[686.4] 
Flawed regime ^ 
Property  
632.1 
[421.5] 
863.7 
[539.3] 
- 711.4 
[550.4] 
Democratic 
regime ^ Property 
-79.3 
[598.3] 
152.3 
[686.4] 
-711.4 
[550.4] 
- 
a. There have been executed four analyses, each with the missing of one regime type. 
Analysis 1 is without autocratic regime and autocratic regime ^ property rights, analysis 2 
without hybrid regime and hybrid regime ^ property rights, analysis 3 without flawed 
regime and flawed regime ^ property rights and analysis 4 without democratic regime and 
democratic regime ^ property rights.  
b. [x] stands for Standard Error 
c. * p < 0.10, *** p < 0.01 
  
As stated earlier, this is done to correct the use of the same value of ‘property rights’ for 
every sub variable of ‘regime type’. A change from any regime type to a flawed regime 
causes a decline in the level of GDP. However, a change from any regime type, which is 
corrected for its own property rights value, to a flawed regime, which is also corrected, causes 
a rise in the level of GDP as shown in analysis 3. So, when the sub variables ‘regime type’ are 
in line with their own value of property rights then a change to a flawed regime is positive for 
the GDP level.         
 Remarkably, the absolute changes in GDP are lower with the variables ‘regime type’ 
which are multiplied with ‘property rights’ than with the regular variables of ‘regime type’. A 
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reason for this change, is the correction of the value of “property rights” on the variables of 
‘regime type’. Above that, the variable ‘property rights’ is only significant in analysis 3. This 
is also different than the analysis of table 3. These changes are both due to the correction of 
‘property rights’ on ‘regime type’.  
Collinearity 
The three hypotheses are tested and the results can be summed up as follows: the 
variable “regime type” has a positive effect on the level of GDP, the variable “property rights” 
has a larger statistical effect on the level of GDP than the sub variables of “regime type” and 
democratic regimes and flawed regimes have a better working property rights system than the 
autocratic and hybrid regimes. However, this could mean that the variable “property rights” is 
not completely independent from the variable “regime type”. This would mean that the 
relation would be as follows: “democratic and flawed regime types”  ‘property rights’  
‘level of GDP’ ( is a positive effect). The variable ‘regime type’ therefore influences the 
value of a states ‘property rights’. However, it is also possible that the variable ‘property 
rights’ influences the variable ‘regime type’.       
 This effect of one independent variable influencing the value of another independent 
variable can cause the problem of collinearity (Argyrous, 2011, pp. 271-272). This means that 
when one independent variable changes then another independent variable also changes. The 
variable ‘regime type’ has an effect on the variable ‘property rights’, perhaps also vice versa. 
This makes collinearity perhaps a problem on the regression analysis because the variables 
affect each other.           
 The problem of collinearity is that the predictive power of the statistical regression 
lowers (Argyrous, 2011, p. 272). This means that the statistical analysis is not as predictive 
and explaining the relation between the variables. However, collinearity becomes a problem 
when the value of the correlation between the concerned variables is higher than 0.8 
(Argyrous, 2011, p. 272). The value of the correlation coefficient between the variable is 
0.643 (see Appendix 8). A value of 0.643 is high, but not high enough to conclude that the 
outcome of the regression analysis is not usable. The equation is still valid therefore 
(Argyrous, 2011, p. 272).      
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Conclusion 
This paper has tried to answer the question; “What is the influence of protecting 
property rights on economic growth?”. The beginning of this paper started with a broader 
theoretical framework, in which concepts like regime type, bureaucracies and property rights 
were illustrated. There is no consensus among authors about the relation of regime type and 
economic growth. Some authors believe that democracies are beneficial for economic growth, 
while other refuse this thesis. The role of institutions was an explainable factor that more 
authors described and could explain the difference in economic growth between autocracies 
and democracies. Institutions are both present in autocracies and democracies. Therefore, 
institutions are good actors to investigate. However, ‘institutions’ is a quite vague concept. 
The protection of property rights was addressed as an important factor for economic 
development by other authors. That is why this paper focused on a more specific concept, 
namely the protection of property rights.       
 Three hypotheses were tested to answer the research question. These hypotheses were 
tested with regression analyses, which compared variables to examine the relation between 
these variables. The results of the analyses showed a positive relation between the variables 
‘property rights’ and ‘GDP’. Besides that, the results showed that a democratic regime type 
was beneficial for the GDP level. However, this relation was influenced by the variable 
‘property rights’. The relation between ‘GDP’ and ‘property rights’ is more significant than 
the relation between ‘GDP’ and ‘regime type’. Finally, the variables ‘property rights’ and 
‘regime type’ were compared. The results of this analysis indicate that democratic regimes 
have a higher value of the property rights system. The variables are correlated.  
 Thus, property rights are beneficial for the level of GDP. This relation is not that 
obvious however. Democratic regimes are also beneficial for the level of GDP, but property 
rights have more influence in this relation. Democratic regimes also have higher values of 
property rights system than autocratic regimes. Both the variables affect the level of GDP and 
both affect each other. This makes it more difficult to conclude how the relation between the 
variables works exactly, due to the problem of collinearity.    
 The discussed literature was consistent with the results. Namely, the literature also 
showed that the protection of property rights was positive for economic growth. The different 
authors gave different arguments for this positive relation. As stated earlier, there was no 
consensus on the effect of different regime types on economic growth. The discussed 
literature did agree more on the positive role of institutions on economic growth. Some 
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authors belief that democratic regimes have better working institutions than autocratic 
regimes. As a part of the functioning of governmental institutions, the protection of property 
rights is indeed better executed in democratic regimes than in autocratic regimes. This change 
in better working property rights can explain the variation of economic growth between the 
different regime types.          
 A possible reason for the difference in the functioning of institutions between 
democratic and autocratic regimes can be the duration of these regimes. Democratic regimes 
are politically more stable than autocratic regimes, as rules and laws cannot be changed that 
easily. Institutions need a long time to develop before they work well. For example, the idea 
of impartiality needs time to develop in a society. The time that regimes are in place are 
perhaps more important than the way leaders are chosen. The protection of property rights 
does not necessarily depend on the how political leaders have come into their position. 
Perhaps it depends more on the time a regime exists and the continuity of laws and rules in a 
state. The idea of the importance of the duration of regimes also came forward from the 
discussed literature. This could also be the reason that democratic regimes protect property 
rights better than autocratic regimes.        
  It is difficult to state that property rights or regime types came first. These two are 
connected. This relation has arisen through a long period of time. This means that the origin 
of this relation is hard to define exactly. It is clear that institutions need a long time to develop 
and that different regime types need institutions to function well. Thus, there is interaction 
between the two. However, the protection of property rights has a greater positive influence 
on the level of GDP than regime types. So, besides the interaction between property rights and 
regime types, the effect of property rights on economic growth is more significant.  
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Appendix 
1: The list of states used for the regression analyses: 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Chad 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique  
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal  
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Australia 
Bangladesh 
China 
Hong Kong 
India 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Kazakhstan 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Sri Lanka 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Albania 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech 
Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Moldova 
Montenegro 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Serbia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Algeria 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrein 
Cyprus 
Egypt 
Georgia 
Iran 
Israel 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Morocco 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Tunisia 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Canada 
United States 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United 
Kingdom 
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2: (The descriptive statistics for the variables): 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
The value of a state's 
property rights system 
128 2,70 8,40 5,4422 1,43530 
Valid N (listwise) 128     
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
The level of the Gross 
Domestic Product 
(epxressed in billion dollars) 
128 $2 $18,037 $570.70 $1,941.788 
Valid N (listwise) 128     
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
The way a state is lead and 
how the leaders are chosen 
128 1,50 9,93 6,1070 2,00975 
Valid N (listwise) 128     
 
 
Autocratic regime 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Non Autocratic 102 79,7 79,7 79,7 
Autocratic 26 20,3 20,3 100,0 
Total 128 100,0 100,0  
 
 
Hybrid Regimes 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not Hybrid 95 74,2 74,2 74,2 
Hybrid 33 25,8 25,8 100,0 
Total 128 100,0 100,0  
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Flawed Regimes 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not Flawed 79 61,7 61,7 61,7 
Flawed 49 38,3 38,3 100,0 
Total 128 100,0 100,0  
 
 
Democratic Regimes 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not Democratic 108 84,4 84,4 84,4 
Democratic 20 15,6 15,6 100,0 
Total 128 100,0 100,0  
 
 
3: (The outcome of the regression analysis used for table 1) 
Coefficients
a
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -1207,650 658,089  -1,835 ,069 
The value of a state's 
property rights system 
326,771 116,955 ,242 2,794 ,006 
a. Dependent Variable: The Gross Domestic Product (expressed in billion dollars) 
 
4: (The outcome of the regression analyses used for table 2) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 728,805 434,496  1,677 ,096 
Autocratic regime -132,528 577,933 -,028 -,229 ,819 
Hybrid Regimes -629,729 550,638 -,142 -1,144 ,255 
Flawed Regimes 81,407 515,599 ,020 ,158 ,875 
a. Dependent Variable: The level of the Gross Domestic Product (expressed in billion dollars) 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 810,212 277,589  2,919 ,004 
Autocratic regime -213,935 471,462 -,045 -,454 ,651 
Hybrid Regimes -711,136 437,575 -,161 -1,625 ,107 
Democratic Regimes -81,407 515,599 -,015 -,158 ,875 
a. Dependent Variable: The level of the Gross Domestic Product (expressed in billion dollars) 
 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 99,076 338,254  ,293 ,770 
Autocratic regime 497,201 509,545 ,103 ,976 ,331 
Democratic Regimes 629,729 550,638 ,118 1,144 ,255 
Flawed Regimes 711,136 437,575 ,179 1,625 ,107 
a. Dependent Variable: The level of the Gross Domestic Product (expressed in billion dollars) 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 596,277 381,078  1,565 ,120 
Democratic Regimes 132,528 577,933 ,025 ,229 ,819 
Flawed Regimes 213,935 471,462 ,054 ,454 ,651 
Hybrid Regimes -497,201 509,545 -,112 -,976 ,331 
a. Dependent Variable: The level of the Gross Domestic Product (expressed in billion dollars) 
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5: (The outcome of the regression analyses used for table 3) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -2919,983 1371,186  -2,130 ,035 
The value of a state's 
property rights system 
486,830 174,023 ,360 2,797 ,006 
Autocratic regime 1136,412 722,725 ,236 1,572 ,118 
Hybrid Regimes 955,196 779,977 ,216 1,225 ,223 
Flawed Regimes 951,292 590,476 ,239 1,611 ,110 
a. Dependent Variable: The level of the Gross Domestic Product (expressed in billion dollars) 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -1968,691 1029,460  -1,912 ,058 
The value of a state's 
property rights system 
486,830 174,023 ,360 2,797 ,006 
Autocratic regime 185,120 480,653 ,039 ,385 ,701 
Hybrid Regimes 3,904 496,803 ,001 ,008 ,994 
Democratic Regimes -951,292 590,476 -,179 -1,611 ,110 
a. Dependent Variable: The level of the Gross Domestic Product (expressed in billion dollars) 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -1964,787 807,915  -2,432 ,016 
The value of a state's 
property rights system 
486,830 174,023 ,360 2,797 ,006 
Autocratic regime 181,216 508,771 ,038 ,356 ,722 
Democratic Regimes -955,196 779,977 -,179 -1,225 ,223 
Flawed Regimes -3,904 496,803 -,001 -,008 ,994 
a. Dependent Variable: The level of the Gross Domestic Product (expressed in billion dollars) 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -1783,571 928,087  -1,922 ,057 
The value of a state's 
property rights system 
486,830 174,023 ,360 2,797 ,006 
Democratic Regimes -1136,412 722,725 -,213 -1,572 ,118 
Flawed Regimes -185,120 480,653 -,047 -,385 ,701 
Hybrid Regimes -181,216 508,771 -,041 -,356 ,722 
a. Dependent Variable: The level of the Gross Domestic Product (expressed in billion dollars) 
 
 
6: (The outcome of the regression analyses used for table 4) 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4,888 ,191  25,534 ,000 
Hybrid Regimes -,649 ,256 -,199 -2,535 ,012 
Flawed Regimes ,820 ,237 ,279 3,461 ,001 
Democratic Regimes 2,607 ,290 ,662 8,977 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: The value of a state's property rights system 
 
 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4,239 ,170  24,947 ,000 
Flawed Regimes 1,469 ,220 ,499 6,681 ,000 
Democratic Regimes 3,256 ,277 ,827 11,768 ,000 
Autocratic regime ,649 ,256 ,183 2,535 ,012 
a. Dependent Variable: The value of a state's property rights system 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5,708 ,139  40,931 ,000 
Democratic Regimes 1,787 ,259 ,454 6,898 ,000 
Autocratic regime -,820 ,237 -,231 -3,461 ,001 
Hybrid Regimes -1,469 ,220 -,449 -6,681 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: The value of a state's property rights system 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 7,495 ,218  34,335 ,000 
Autocratic regime -2,607 ,290 -,734 -8,977 ,000 
Hybrid Regimes -3,256 ,277 -,996 -11,768 ,000 
Flawed Regimes -1,787 ,259 -,607 -6,898 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: The value of a state's property rights system 
 
7: The outcome of the regression analyses used for the interaction effect) 
Regression analyses for Interaction effect 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -471,115 1707,642  -,276 ,783 
The value of a state's 
property rights system 
218,349 341,070 ,161 ,640 ,523 
Hybrid Regimes 626,154 2673,757 ,142 ,234 ,815 
Flawed Regimes -3573,280 2233,342 -,898 -1,600 ,112 
Democratic Regimes 157,665 4082,338 ,030 ,039 ,969 
Hybrid_Property -231,550 588,119 -,226 -,394 ,694 
Flawed_Property 632,118 421,540 ,933 1,500 ,136 
Democratic_Property -79,289 598,280 -,112 -,133 ,895 
a. Dependent Variable: The level of the Gross Domestic Product (epxressed in billion dollars) 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 155,039 2057,410  ,075 ,940 
The value of a state's 
property rights system 
-13,201 479,120 -,010 -,028 ,978 
Flawed Regimes -4199,433 2510,919 -1,055 -1,672 ,097 
Democratic Regimes -468,489 4240,564 -,088 -,110 ,912 
Flawed_Property 863,668 539,373 1,275 1,601 ,112 
Democratic_Property 152,261 686,415 ,216 ,222 ,825 
Autocratic regime -626,154 2673,757 -,130 -,234 ,815 
Autocratic_Property 231,550 588,119 ,243 ,394 ,694 
a. Dependent Variable: The level of the Gross Domestic Product (epxressed in billion dollars) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -4044,395 1439,366  -2,810 ,006 
The value of a state's 
property rights system 
850,467 247,724 ,629 3,433 ,001 
Democratic Regimes 3730,945 3977,589 ,700 ,938 ,350 
Democratic_Property -711,407 550,434 -1,009 -1,292 ,199 
Autocratic regime 3573,280 2233,342 ,743 1,600 ,112 
Autocratic_Property -632,118 421,540 -,662 -1,500 ,136 
Hybrid_Property -863,668 539,373 -,842 -1,601 ,112 
Hybrid Regimes 4199,433 2510,919 ,950 1,672 ,097 
a. Dependent Variable: The level of the Gross Domestic Product (epxressed in billion dollars) 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -313,450 3708,024  -,085 ,933 
The value of a state's 
property rights system 
139,060 491,539 ,103 ,283 ,778 
Autocratic regime -157,665 4082,338 -,033 -,039 ,969 
Autocratic_Property 79,289 598,280 ,083 ,133 ,895 
Hybrid_Property -152,261 686,415 -,149 -,222 ,825 
Hybrid Regimes 468,489 4240,564 ,106 ,110 ,912 
Flawed_Property 711,407 550,434 1,050 1,292 ,199 
Flawed Regimes -3730,945 3977,589 -,938 -,938 ,350 
a. Dependent Variable: The level of the Gross Domestic Product (epxressed in billion dollars) 
 
 
8: (The test for the collinearity)  
 
Correlations 
 
The value of a 
state's property 
rights system 
The way a state 
is lead and how 
the leaders are 
chosen 
The value of a state's 
property rights system 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,643
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 128 128 
The way a state is lead and 
how the leaders are chosen 
Pearson Correlation ,643
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 128 128 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
